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INTRODUCTION

I would like to thank Professor Barker for inviting me to participate in this seminar on Judicial Review in the Americas. It
marks the third time I have been honored with an invitation to
speak at conferences sponsored by the Duquesne University
School of Law. Today, I will be speaking on judicial review in
Canada and, more particularly, the important and often difficult
role courts perform in judicially reviewing the decisions of administrative tribunals, boards and commissions. The Supreme Court
of Canada commented on the increasingly important role that administrative tribunals play in Canadian society. As stated by Justice Cory:
Administrative boards play an increasingly important role in
our society. They regulate many aspects of our life, from beginning to end. Hospitals and medical boards regulate the
methods and practice of the doctors that bring us into this
world. Boards regulate the licensing and the operation of
morticians who are concerned with our mortal remains. Marketing boards regulate the farm products we eat; transport
boards regulate the means and flow of our travel; energy
boards control the price and distribution of the forms of energy we use; planning boards and city councils regulate the
location and types of buildings in which we live and work. In
Canada, boards are a way of life. Boards and the functions
they fulfill are legion.'
It is in the context of this "regulated" world that judicial review
has gained importance. Judicial review is the principal, and often
the only, avenue available to individuals seeking recourse against
state action.
1. Newfoundland Tel. Co. v. Newfoundland (Bd. of Comm'rs of Pub. Util.), [1992] 1
S.C.R. 623, [1992] S.C.J. No. 21 (QL) at para. 17.
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Canadian courts have been grappling with judicial review of
administrative action for the last quarter century. Over the years,
the Supreme Court of Canada has written hundreds of pages of
decisions outlining the principles of judicial review, but their application has been fraught with difficulties. In the last five years,
however, the Supreme Court has rendered seminal decisions,
enunciating rules in determining the appropriate standard of review. These decisions have provided much needed guidance to
judges, legal practitioners and law students working in this area
of the law.
The goal of this article is not to present the fine points of the
law on judicial review in Canada. Rather, my goal is to discuss
some of the underlying principles of judicial review and the legal
rules that have thus emerged. To give context to my discussion, I
will begin by providing a synopsis of the Canadian legal system,
from the organization of our court structure to the constitutional
division of legislative powers and to the establishment of administrative tribunals. I will then touch on some of the rules that have
been established to determine the appropriate standard of review
applicable to administrative action, and will finish with the legal
test applicable to the appellate review of judicial decisions.
PART I: THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A.

The Constitutionand the Courts

Section 101 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, authorizes the Federal
Parliament to provide a "General Court of Appeal for Canada" and
"any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws
of Canada." The government exercised this power in 1875 when it
created the Supreme Court of Canada, which is now the ultimate
appellate authority in Canada. The Federal Court of Appeal, the
Federal Court and the Tax Court of Canada were also created under this section.
Section 92(14) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, gives the provincial
governments jurisdiction over "the administration of justice" in
the provinces, which includes "the constitution, organization and
maintenance" of the courts. The provincial governments have relied on this power to establish superior and appellate courts
within their respective province. However, section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, gives the Federal Parliament the power to "appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and County Courts in
each Province." While provinces have jurisdiction to establish su-
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perior courts, it is the federal government that has the power to
appoint judges to these courts. There are 1100 such judges in
Canada. The provincial governments do, however, have jurisdiction to appoint judges to the lowest level of court (generally known
as "provincial courts").
B.

The Organizationof Courts in Canada

Canada's system of justice is represented by a four-tiered structure. Within that structure, only certain courts have jurisdiction
2
to entertain applications for judicial review.
At the bottom of the tier are the provincial courts, which are
generally divided within each province into various divisions, such
as a Small Claims Division, a Family Division and a Criminal Division. These courts have very specific jurisdiction, which does not
include judicial review of administrative action.
The tier above is comprised of the trial or first-level courts, including the Federal Court, the Tax Court of Canada and the provincial and territorial superior courts of general jurisdiction. The
federal courts have judicial review jurisdiction over all federal
administrative tribunals and the provincial superior courts over
provincial administrative tribunals.
The next tier is comprised of various appellate courts, including
the Federal Court of Appeal, the provincial courts of appeal, as
well as the Court Martial Appeal Court, established under the
National Defence Act. 3 The Federal Court of Appeal has original
judicial review jurisdiction over fourteen specified federal administrative tribunals. It also sits as an appellate court for appeals of
all decisions of the Federal Court. Appeals from the provincial
superior courts on judicial review application are heard by the
provincial courts of appeal.
The Supreme Court of Canada is the top tier as Canada's highest court. It is a general court of appeal from all other appellate
courts of law and therefore has jurisdiction over disputes in all
areas of law, including administrative and constitutional law. It
hears appeals from both the federal court system, headed by the
Federal Court of Appeal, and the provincial court systems, headed
in each province by that province's Court of Appeal. The Supreme
Court of Canada therefore functions as a national court of last resort, not merely a federal court of appeal. Appeals are by leave
2.
3.

See Appendix.
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5.
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and are granted only where the matter raises a serious question of
general importance. As the highest court, the Supreme Court's
decisions are binding on all of the courts in Canada.
Let me say a few more words about the federal courts. The Federal Court of Appeal, as well as the Federal Court, is a court of
easy access. We place considerable importance on accessibility
due to the national and itinerant nature of the Court. Easy access
to the Court is essential as many of the litigants who appear before us are self-represented and often have no legal training.
Several features enhance the accessibility of the federal courts.
There is no need for a special call to appear before the Federal
Court of Appeal in a province other than the one counsel was initially called in. Every person who is a barrister or a solicitor in a
province may practice as a barrister or a solicitor in the Court and
is an officer of the Court. The Federal Court of Appeal is easily
accessible through its local offices. While the Court's principal
office is located in Ottawa, the Court has sixteen local offices established throughout Canada.
The Federal Court of Appeal is accessible in both of Canada's official languages, English and French. Parties appearing before
the Federal Court of Appeal are able to use either official language
in their written and oral pleadings. When the Crown is a party, it
is required to use the language of the other party. The court rules
also require that simultaneous translation be available at the request of either party. Finally, the Court is bijural because it administers the two legal systems of the common law and the Quebec civil law.
C.

ConstitutionalDivision of Legislative Powers

Canada's Constitution provides for the division of legislative
power between the Federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Both levels of government may only exercise powers that
have been allocated to them under the Constitution.
Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, are the main
provisions that delineate the sphere of competence for each level of
government. Section 91 gives the Federal Parliament the exclusive power to make laws in relation to matters such as trade and
commerce, national defence, unemployment insurance, navigation
and shipping, criminal law, copyrights and patents, and the postal
service.
Section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, provides exclusive jurisdiction to the legislature of each province to make laws in areas
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such as education, property, civil rights, hospitals, municipalities
and other matters of a local or private nature within the provinces.
Accordingly, in Canada we have federal administrative tribunals as well as provincial administrative tribunals. The federalprovincial division of powers affects the types of administrative
tribunals that each government can create. Only those powers
that properly fall within each government's respective sphere of
jurisdiction can be delegated to an administrative tribunal.
PART II: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

Before proceeding further with this analysis, it is important to
appreciate the purpose of judicial review of administrative actions
and its concomitance with judicial independence.
A.

Defining JudicialReview

The term "judicial review" generally refers to a court's review of
the decision of an administrative tribunal. That decision may be
interlocutory or final.
1.

The Purpose of JudicialReview

The purpose of judicial review is to respect the intent of the legislature while ensuring that the decisions of administrative tribunals comply with the rule of law. As the Supreme Court affirmed
in Reference re Secession of Quebec,4 "[a]t its most basic level, the
rule of law vouchsafes to the citizens and residents of the country
a stable, predictable and ordered society in which to conduct their
affairs. It provides a shield for individuals from arbitrary state
action." 5

Judicial review therefore highlights the tension that exists between administrative autonomy and judicial oversight. On the
one hand, the legislature has the power to create administrative
tribunals to carry out statutory regimes but, on the other hand,
courts have an overarching obligation to oversee the actions of
administrative tribunals to ensure that they adhere to the rule of
law. The courts have addressed this tension by undertaking a limited supervisory role vis-A-vis tribunals. That limited role is key
4. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. See also Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution,
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
5. Id. at para. 70.
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to understanding judicial review in Canada. A court will not
automatically substitute its decision for that of the tribunal. Such
intervention would be contrary to the will of the legislature.
Rather, courts will show some deference to the tribunal's decision
and will intervene only in specified circumstances.
2.

JudicialIndependence

One of the fundamental principles of judicial review is the concept of judicial independence. Judicial independence is the "lifeblood of constitutionalism in democratic societies." 6 An independent judiciary is necessary to "ensure that the power of the state is
exercised in accordance with the rule of law and the provisions of
our Constitution. In this capacity, courts act as a shield against
unwarranted deprivations by the state of the rights and freedoms
of individuals."
It is the principle of judicial independence that reflects the fundamental distinction between administrative tribunals and courts.
In Ocean Port Hotel Ltd.,8 Chief Justice McLachlin, for the Supreme Court, discussed this distinction and noted that "[s]uperior
courts, by virtue of their role as courts of inherent jurisdiction, are
constitutionally required to possess objective guarantees of both
individual and institutional independence." 9
The purpose behind the principle of judicial independence in respect of courts is the ability of judges to hear and decide cases free
of influence. In other words, "no outsider - be it government,
pressure group, individual or even another judge - should interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way in which a judge
conducts his or her case and makes his or her decision." 10 Over
recent years, the principle of judicial independence has also expanded to include institutional independence, which refers to the
court's independence from the other branches of government. 1
The principle of judicial independence exists in Canada in numerous forms. The preamble to the ConstitutionAct, 1867, states
that Canada is to have a Constitution "similar in Principle to that
of the United Kingdom." As noted by the Supreme Court, "[s]ince
judicial independence has been for centuries an important princi6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768.
Ell v. Alberta, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, 2003 SCC 35, at para. 22.
[2001] S.C.J. No. 17 (QL), 2001 SCC 52.
Id. at para. 23-24.
Id. at para. 21-22.
Id. at para. 20.
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ple of the Constitution of the United Kingdom, it is fair to infer
that it was transferred to Canada by the constitutional language
of the preamble." 12 In addition, judicial independence is explicitly
referenced in sections 96 through 100 of the Constitution Act,
1867.13 For example, superior court judges in Canada enjoy a
high degree of security of tenure in the constitutional guarantee of
section 99 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, which provides that they
"shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by
the Governor General on Address of the Senate and House of
Commons." Finally, section 11(d) of the Charterexpressly entitles
those arraigned before courts to "an independent and impartial
tribunal."
An independent judiciary has long been recognized as the foundation upon which a true democracy rests because it allows judges
to make impartial decisions without fear of consequence. This is
critical since public trust in the legal system and the judiciary depends upon society's confidence in the impartiality of individual
decisions. Impartiality does not mean that judges have no sympathies or opinions, but rather that they are free to consider and act
upon different points of view without interference from any
source. The judiciary is increasingly at the center of many current
debates about social change and social values. As a result, the
public has attained a new awareness of the crucial need for judges
who are free to make independent and impartial decisions, and to
apply the law as they understand it, without fear or favour, and
without regard to whether a decision is popular or not.
Independence of the judiciary, impartiality of the judges and access to justice are fundamental values in the eyes of all Canadians, representing the very essence of a free and democratic society. The public's acceptance and support of judicial decisions is
dependent upon the public's confidence in the integrity and independence of the judges. It is therefore important that the Federal
Court of Appeal and its judges be perceived as independent and
impartial.
As a democratic society, Canada has undergone some very important changes in the relationship between individuals and the
state. The judiciary in Canada must have the necessary knowledge and experience to contribute significantly to the maintenance
and ongoing evolution of our free and democratic society. The role
12.
13.

R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768.
Id.
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of the courts as adjudicators of disputes, interpreters of the law,
and defenders of the Constitution and the Charter requires that
their powers and functions be completely separate from all other
stakeholders in the legal system. Canada's tradition of judicial
independence ensures that the courts will continue to be accessible to everyone and that the proceedings remain public, transparent and free of interference from the government.
B.

Administrative Tribunals

I will now provide some context to judicial review by giving an
overview on the establishment of administrative tribunals and the
scope of their administrative activities.
1.

The Creationof Administrative Tribunals (Federaland
Provincial)

Administrative tribunals are established by Parliament and legislatures for the purpose of implementing the government's policy
as it is expressed in a statute. 14 As such, administrative tribunals
act as an arm of government. While they are distinct from the
judiciary, they are not clearly separate from government. The degree of independence of a particular tribunal is determined by the
legislature in its enabling statute.
At the federal level, there are hundreds of administrative tribunals, each with their own structures and functions. Some tribunals consist simply of a public official exercising executive or administrative powers under a federal statute, while others are
composed of a number of persons. For example, the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration has the power to facilitate a person's
admission to Canada when an application has been submitted for
permanent residency on humanitarian and compassionate considerations. 15 In practice, the Minister delegates this power to an
immigration officer, and the administrative decision is made by
that officer based on a set of pre-determined guidelines.
By contrast, some tribunals are created to adjudicate the rights
of individuals in a quasi-judicial forum. The Canada Industrial
Board has jurisdiction with regard to some one million employees
engaged in the federally regulated industries. Its wide range of
14. Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (Gen. Manager, Liquor Control and
Licensing Branch), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, [2001] S.C.J. No. 17 (QL) at para. 24.
15. IMMIGRATION ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s. 114(2); IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS,
SOR/78-172, § 2.1
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activities include certifying trade unions, investigating complaints
of unfair labour practice and issuing cease and desist orders in
cases of unlawful strikes and lockouts.
The Canadian International Trade Tribunal performs duties
under many federal laws, such as the Special Import Measures
Act 16 and the Customs Act. 17 Its mandate includes conducting
inquiries into the effect of imports on domestic industries, hearing
appeals of decisions of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
and conducting inquiries into complaints by potential suppliers
concerning procurement by the federal government.
The Canada TransportationAccident Investigation and Safety
BoardAct' 8 created a board that makes decisions on a wide range
of economic matters involving federally-regulated modes of transportation (air, rail and marine).
There is, therefore, a wide spectrum of administrative tribunals
in Canada. However, they are not courts of law. They are not
presided over by "judges." Typically referred to as "chairperson,"
the head of a tribunal is appointed by the Executive as the chief
executive officer of the tribunal. Chairpersons may be experts of
the narrow legal field handled by the tribunal and are generally
responsible for the assignment of members and for the management of the tribunal's work. Members of a tribunal come from a
variety of educational backgrounds, careers and regions of the
country, and may include experts, representatives of the government and, in some cases, members of the community.
Procedures of tribunals are often less formal than those of a
court. 19 Evidence that would be inadmissible in a court hearing
may be allowed in a tribunal hearing. Many tribunals have farreaching powers, such as the power to summon and enforce the
appearance of persons before them, compel them to give oral or
written evidence under oath and to produce such documents and
things as the tribunal deems requisite; tribunals retain these powers to the same extent as a superior court of record. In many instances, the tribunal may also receive evidence and other information, whether or not that evidence or information is or would be
admissible in a court of law.

16.
17.
18.

R.S.C. 1985, c. S-15.
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2d Supp.).
S.C. 1989, c. 3.

19.

GILLES PIPIN & YVES OUELLETTE, PRINCIPES DE CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 15-

16 (2d ed. 1982).
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However, no matter how court-like they may seem, administrative tribunals are not courts of law. The Canadian legal model
makes a clear distinction between judicial courts and administrative tribunals. The terms are not interchangeable. 20 While most
administrative procedures are characterized by some sort of internal appeal mechanism, judicial courts retain the ultimate oversight function, be that by means of statutory right of appeal or
application for judicial review. The oversight of tribunals falls to
the same court system that is vested with the authority to hear
private law disputes involving individual citizens.
2.

The Scope of Administrative Activity
a.

ProceduralFairness

Administrative tribunals perform a number of functions, ranging from the purely administrative, to implementing regulatory
regimes, to adjudicating the rights of individuals. All administrative bodies, no matter what their function, have a duty of fairness. 21 The existence of a duty of fairness, however, does not determine what will be required in a given set of circumstances. The
concept of procedural fairness is eminently variable, and its content is to be decided in the specific context of each case. 22 The content of these rules is determined by reference to all the circumstances under which the tribunal operates. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada:
Some administrative tribunals are closer to the executive end
of the spectrum: their primary purpose is to develop, or supervise the implementation of, particular government policies.
Such tribunals may require little by way of procedural protections. Other tribunals, however, are closer to the judicial end
of the spectrum: their primary purpose is to adjudicate disputes through some form of hearing. Tribunals at this end of
the spectrum may possess court-like powers and procedures.
These powers may bring with them stringent requirements of

20.
21.
22.

Dussault & Borgeat, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768.
Martineau v. Matsqui Inst. Disciplinary Bd., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 at 628.
Knight v. Indian Head Sch. Div. No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 at 682.
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procedural fairness, including a higher requirement of inde23
pendence.
What are these factors?
rized them as follows:

The Supreme Court of Canada summa-

e the nature, of the decision being made and the process followed in making it;24
* the nature of the statutory scheme and the "terms of the
25
statute pursuant to which the body operates";
* the importance of the decision to the individual or individu26
als affected;
e the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the
decision; 27 and
o the choices of procedure made by the agency itself, particularly when the statute leaves to the decision-maker the ability
to choose its own procedures, or when the tribunal has an expertise in determining what procedures are appropriate under
28
the circumstances.
These five factors are non-exhaustive and other factors may be
important in determining the requisite level of procedural fairness
in a given set of circumstances. In making such a determination,
it is necessary to keep in mind the values underlying the duty of
fairness which is:
to ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair
and open procedure, appropriate to the decisions being made
in its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity for those affected by the decision to put forward

23. Bell Can. v. Canadian Tel. Employees Ass'n, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884, 2003 SCC 36 at
para. 21.
24. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 39 (QL) at para. 23.
25. Id. at para. 24.
26. Id. at para. 25.
27. Id. at para. 26.
28. Id. at para. 27.
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their views and evidence fully and have them considered by
the decision-maker. 29
In short, procedural fairness seeks to ensure that decisions affecting the rights, interests and privileges of persons be made us30
ing a fair, impartial, and open process.
In this context, I would like to discuss judicial review in relation
to Aboriginal law. Section 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, constitutionalized "the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada." As such, courts may be called upon to
determine on judicial review whether there has been an infringement of a constitutionally-protected treaty right. Over recent
years, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the specific issue
of the duty of government to consult with Aboriginal peoples and
accommodate their interests when Aboriginal title or rights are at
issue.
In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Ministerof Forests) 3 1 the
question was whether the government is required to consult with
First Nation peoples about decisions to harvest certain forests and
to accommodate their concerns about the proposed harvest before
they have proven their title to land and their Aboriginal rights.
Similarly, in Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (ProjectAssessment Director),32 the issue also centered on the
duty to consult, this time with the Taku River Tlingit First Nation
in making a decision to reopen an old mine and build a road
through a portion of the Taku Tlingit First Nation's traditional
territory.
Finally, the case Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister
of CanadianHeritage)33 addressed the question of whether certain
treaty rights were infringed when the Minister decided to permit
the construction of a winter road through Wood Buffalo National
Park.
The Supreme Court concluded that the government has a legal
duty to consult with, and accommodate the interests of, Aboriginal
peoples. That duty arises "when the Crown has knowledge, real or
constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or

29.
[1999]
30.
31.
32.
33.

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817,
S.C.J. No. 39 (QL) at para. 22.
Id. at para. 28.
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 511.
[20041 3 S.C.R. 550, 2004 SCC 74.
[2005 3 S.C.R. 388.
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title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it." 34
35
However, the content of the duty varies with the circumstances.
"The scope of the duty is proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of the
right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed." 36 In all cases, the government is required to provide meaningful consultation,3 7 but there is
38
no duty to agree.
Good faith consultation may, in turn, require a duty to accommodate the interests of the First Nation peoples. More specifically:
Where a strong prima facie case exists for the claim, and the
consequences of the government's proposed decision may adversely affect it in a significant way, addressing the Aboriginal concerns may require taking steps to avoid irreparable
harm or to minimize the effects of infringement, pending final
39
resolution of the underlying claim.
On the duty to accommodate, Professor Mullan highlighted the
difficulty courts face in determining on judicial review whether
the government fulfilled its obligation of accommodation. As he
stated, "[t]he really problematic aspect of the accommodation concept, however, is that of identifying the criteria by which the
courts should review a failed attempt or one that did not achieve
agreement." 40
The question then becomes: "In what circumstances is a court entitled to say that the government (or its agencies and tribunals) did not go far enough in its willingness to ac41
commodate the concerns of the affected First Nations?"

34. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 at para.
35.
35. Id. at para. 37, 39.
36. Id. at para. 39.
37. Id. at para. 41.
38. Id. at para. 42.
39. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 at para.
47.
40. David Mullan, Federal Court of Appeal Annual Education Seminar: Recent Administrative Law Developments in The Supreme Court of Canada - 2005-06, 5 (Sept. 7-9,
2006).
41. Id.
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Charterof Rights and Freedoms

Since its inception in 1982, Canada's Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (hereinafter "Charter")42 has also had a significant impact on administrative law. The Charterhas become a staple in
Canadian society. Its preamble states that "Canada is founded
upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule
of law" and sets out those rights and freedoms which are guaranteed. Sections 2 through 14 protect fundamental freedoms and
rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association; the
right of citizens to enter, remain in, and leave Canada; the right to
life, liberty and security of the person; protection from unreasonable search and seizure; and protection from arbitrary detention
or imprisonment.
It should be noted, however, that these guaranteed rights and
freedoms can be limited by law in accordance with section 1 of the
Charter. Section 1 subjects the rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the Charterto "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
The Charter has had two significant impacts on the scope of
administrative activity. First, the Charter applies to tribunals
exercising statutory powers or implementing a government policy
or program, even if the tribunal is otherwise independent of government. 43 In this regard, tribunals must comply with the principles of fundamental justice in respect of the conduct of its proceed42. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, being
Schedule B to the CANADA ACT 1982 (U.K.), c. 11 (1982).
43. Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Comm'n), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86; Slaight Commc'ns Inc.
v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45. In considering the question of whether the Charterapplies to the actions of the British Columbia Human Rights Commission, the Supreme Court
of Canada concluded the following:
[N]otwithstanding that the Commission may have adjudicatory characteristics,
it is a statutory creature and its actions fall under the authority of the Human
Rights Code. The state has instituted an administrative structure, through a
legislative scheme, to effectuate a governmental program to provide redress
against discrimination. It is the administration of a governmental program
that calls for Charter scrutiny. Once a complaint is brought before the Commission, the subsequent administrative proceedings must comply with the
Charter. These entities are subject to Charter scrutiny in the performance of
their functions just as government would be in like circumstances. To hold otherwise would allow the legislative branch to circumvent the Charter by establishing statutory bodies that are immune to Charter scrutiny. The above analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that the Charter applies to the actions of
the Commission.
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Comm'n), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43.
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ings. Second, the powers exercised by a tribunal may be challenged on the ground that a provision of its enabling statute or
regulations violates the Charter. This brings me to a brief explanation of the remedies available under the Charter.
c.

Section 52 of the Constitution

Subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,44 provides that
Canada's Constitution is the "supreme law of Canada, and any
law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is,
to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect." In other
words, the laws of Canada must respect the Constitution, including the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Charter. Where
a statutory provision is determined to be inconsistent with the
Charter,the courts may make a declaration of unconstitutionality
and strike down the offending provision. Administrative tribunals
do not have the power to make declarations of unconstitutionality,
although they have the authority to refuse to apply a provision of
their enabling statute found to be inconsistent with the Charter.
This power is given to tribunals which have been conferred the
authority to interpret the law.
The first question one must ask is whether the enabling statute
explicitly or implicitly grants to the tribunal jurisdiction to interpret or decide any question of law. 45 An express grant of authority
to consider or decide questions of law arising under a legislative
provision is presumed to extend to determining the constitutional
validity of that provision. 4 6 Absent an explicit grant, it becomes
necessary to consider whether the legislature intended to confer
upon the tribunal implied jurisdiction to decide questions of law
under the challenged provision. 47 Implied jurisdiction must be
discerned by looking at the statute as a whole. 4 8 Relevant factors
will include:
9 the statutory mandate of the tribunal in issue and whether
deciding questions of law is necessary to fulfilling this mandate effectively;
44. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, being Schedule B to the CANADA ACT 1982 (U.K.), c. 11
(1982).
45. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Bd.) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504; Nova
Scotia (Workers' Comp. Bd.) v. Laseur, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 2003 SCC 54.
46. Id.
47. Id. at para. 41.
48. Id.
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* the interaction of the tribunal in question with other elements of the administrative system;
* whether the tribunal is adjudicative in nature; and
" practical consideration including the tribunal's capacity to
49
consider questions of law.
The result is significant. Administrative tribunals that have
the power by statute to determine questions of law will have the
concomitant jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of
a provision before it. There is, however, an important limitation
on the scope of an administrative tribunal's jurisdiction with respect to Charter issues: administrative bodies do not have the
power to make general declarations of invalidity. As explained by
the Supreme Court:
A determination by a tribunal that a provision of its enabling
statute is invalid pursuant to the Charteris not binding on future decision makers, within or outside the tribunal's administrative scheme. Only by obtaining a formal declaration of
invalidity by a court can a litigant establish the general invalidity of a legislative provision for all future cases. Therefore,
allowing administrative tribunals to decide Charter issues
does not undermine the role of the courts as final arbiters of
50
constitutionality in Canada.
Accordingly, a tribunal that can decide questions of law may interpret the relevant Charterright, apply it to the impugned provision and, if it finds a breach and concludes that the provision is
not saved under section 1, it may disregard the provision on constitutional grounds and rule on the party's claim as if the impugned provision were not in force. The tribunal does not, however, have the authority to make a declaration of unconstitutionality and strike down the offending provision. The tribunal's decision will be binding only on the parties to the particular proceeding in which the issue was raised and is subject to judicial review
by the courts.

49. Id.
50. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Bd.) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504; Nova
Scotia (Workers' Comp. Bd.) v. Laseur, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 2003 SCC 54.
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Section 24 of the Charter

The second remedy available under the Charteris found in section 24. Subsection 24(1) provides that "anyone whose rights or
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or
denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain
such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances." The question remains: what is a "court of competent jurisdiction" pursuant to subsection 24(1)?
The Supreme Court of Canada has considered the attributes of a
"court of competent jurisdiction" on a number of occasions. A
"court of competent jurisdiction" is one that possesses (1) jurisdiction over the person; (2) jurisdiction over the subject matter; and
(3) jurisdiction to grant the remedy. 51 A court or tribunal must
possess these three attributes to be considered a "court of competent jurisdiction" for the purpose of providing relief under Charter
subsection 24(1).
The question of whether a court or tribunal enjoys the "power to
grant the remedy sought" is a matter of discerning the intention of
Parliament or the legislature. "The governing question in every
case is whether the legislator endowed the court or tribunal with
the power to pronounce on Charter rights and to grant the remedy
sought for the breach of these rights." 52 Accordingly, the power of
a tribunal to grant the remedy sought must emanate from its enabling statute.
A legislative grant of remedial power under section 24(1) may be
either express or implied. Whether a legislative grant is implied
requires a "functional and structural" analysis. In the decision of
R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc.,53 the Supreme Court stated the test as,
"whether the legislature or Parliament has furnished the court or
tribunal with the tools necessary to fashion the remedy sought
under [section] 24 in a just, fair and consistent manner without
54
impeding its ability to perform its intended function."
If a tribunal does have "the power to grant the remedy sought,"
and if the tribunal also has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter, the tribunal will have the power to grant remedies
under section 24.
51.
ber v.
S.C.R.
52.
53.
54.

R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39 (QL) at para. 39. See also WeOntario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929; Mooring v. Canada (Nat'l Parole Bd.), [1996] 1
75.
R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575 at 589.
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 575.
Id. 598.

Judicial Review in Canada

Spring 2007

e.

Enforcement of Orders

One final point regarding the scope of administrative activity relates to the enforcement of tribunals' orders. Tribunals often possess significant powers enabling them to carry out their statutory
mandates, such as powers of search and seizure of documents,
subpoena and investigation. Yet, they do not possess the power to
punish for disregard of their orders. Unlike the European continental system, which enables administrative courts to enforce
their own orders, Canadian tribunals must ultimately rely on the
apparatus of the courts for enforcement. The statute by which a
tribunal is created will indicate whether its orders can be filed
with the court for enforcement. 55
3.

The Path to JudicialReview

I will now examine judicial review in the context of federal tribunals. While there are differences in procedures in other jurisdictions, the basic principles apply universally in Canada.
Judicial review may be accomplished by way of both applications for judicial review and statutory rights of appeal. Anyone
directly affected by the decision of an administrative tribunal may
apply for judicial review as of right pursuant to subsection 18.1(1)
of the Federal Courts Act. 56 By contrast, a statutory right of ap-

peal may be limited; the appeal provision may require that leave
be obtained, may limit the appeal to questions of law or jurisdiction or may require the certification of a question by a trial judge,
as is the case for refugee claims. For example, the Competition
Tribunal Act provides that leave is required for the Federal Court
of Appeal to hear an appeal from the Competition Tribunal on a
question of fact.
Section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act precludes judicial review
in respect of a decision or order of an administrative tribunal
where there already exists a statutory right of appeal to one of the
courts or bodies listed in section 18.5.
a.

CollateralAttacks

A party who seeks to challenge the decision of a federal administrative tribunal's decision is not free to chose between a judicial
55.

J. I. Laskin, Enforcement Powers of Administrative Agencies, in ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND PLURALISM 191, 223 (Carswell 1993).

56.

R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
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review proceeding and an action for damages. To have the decision of a federal administrative tribunal invalidated, a party is
required to proceed by way of judicial review. Section 18.1 of the
Federal Courts Act provides that the Federal Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of the decisions made
by any federal board, commission or other tribunal. In Grenier v.
Canada,57 Justice L6tourneau, on behalf of the Federal Court of
Appeal, stated two important developments. First, it is not possible to circumvent section 18.1 by way of declaratory action and to
thereby seek to obtain extraordinary remedies. Second, the Federal Courts, as well as superior courts, must not allow actions for
relief against the Crown until applicable mechanisms for judicial
review have been exhausted. 58 Judicial review should be viewed
as a precondition to proceeding against the Crown by way of action, so as to prevent collateral attacks on decisions. A decision
rendered by an administrative federal body continues to have ju59
dicial effect so long as it is not invalidated.
As Justice D~cary explained in Prentice v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police),60 "the fact that a decision of a federal
administrative tribunal is lawful forecloses a finding of negligence
in respect of the decision." 61 In addition, "even a finding that such
a decision was unlawful does not necessarily entail a finding of
fault or negligence and would not necessarily result in a finding of
62
liability."
b.

Jurisdictionof the Courts

As mentioned earlier, administrative law is unified into our single legal system. As such, administrative tribunals are subject to
judicial review by ordinary judicial courts. That being said, jurisdiction to consider an application for judicial review does not fall
upon any court. It is the source of an administrative tribunal's
authority that is the primary determinant in deciding which court
has jurisdiction to entertain an application for judicial review of
the tribunal's decision or order. As a general rule, if an administrative tribunal is empowered by federal legislation, it will fall
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. If it is empowered by
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

[2005] F.C.J. No. 1778 (QL), 2005 FCA 348.
Id. at para. 33.
Id. at para. 18.
[2005] F.C.J. No. 1954 (QL), 2005 FCA 395.
Id. at para. 32.
Id.
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provincial statute, jurisdiction will belong to the respective provincial superior court.
In the federal context, judicial review is governed by the Federal
Courts Act. 6 3 In most cases, judicial review will originate in the
Federal Court. 64 However, the Federal Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for judicial review
made in respect of the tribunals listed in subsection 28(1) of the
Federal Courts Act, including:
* the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission;
" the Canadian International Trade Tribunal;
" the National Energy Board;
" the Canada Industrial Relations Board;
" the Public Service Labour Relations Board;
" the Copyright Board; and
* the Competition Tribunal.
The Federal Court of Appeal may also be granted original judicial review jurisdiction by statute. 65 The Federal Court of Appeal
therefore plays a dual role. It has exclusive and original judicial
review jurisdiction over some federal administrative tribunals and
it hears appeals from the decisions of the Federal Court on judicial
review applications. This distinction is significant because, depending on whether the Federal Court of Appeal is hearing an application for judicial review or hearing an appeal of a judicial decision of the Federal Court, the applicable legal tests will differ.
The exclusive judicial review jurisdiction of the federal courts
over federal tribunals is subject to two limitations. First, the Federal Courts Act does not confer on the federal courts jurisdiction to
issue habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, except in relation to members of the Canadian Forces serving outside Canada. 66 The provincial superior courts retain jurisdiction to issue this writ against
federal tribunals. Second, the question of constitutional limitation
of the tribunal may be raised in provincial and superior courts.

63. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
64. FEDERAL COURTS ACT, R.S.C., 1985 c. F-7, § 18.
65. See, e.g., Canada (A.G.) v. Inuvialuit Reg'l Corp. (1994), 119 D.L.R. (4th) 373
(F.C.A.).
66. FEDERAL CouRTs ACT, R.S.C., 1985 c. F-7, § 18(2).
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Special Proceduresfor JudicialReview

All proceedings before the Federal Court and the Federal Court
of Appeal are conducted in accordance with the Federal Courts
Rules. 67 Applications for judicial review are specifically addressed
under rule 300.
The Federal Courts Act attempts to codify the federal common
law on judicial review. Subsection 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts
Act sets out the grounds which an applicant must establish to succeed on an application for judicial review. The Federal Court may
grant relief if it is satisfied that the federal board, commission or
other tribunal:
e acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
e failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural
fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to observe;
* erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not
the error appears on the face of the record;
* based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that
it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for
the material before it;
" acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence;
or
" acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
These grounds for review also apply to administrative action that
68
is reviewable by the Federal Court of Appeal.
On judicial review, the parties are generally restricted to introducing material that was before the tribunal when it made its decision. However, extrinsic evidence may be allowed where the
evidence is relevant to an allegation that the tribunal breached
procedural fairness, committed jurisdictional error or where the
material provides general background. 69
a.

Standing (of Administrative Tribunals)

Subsection 18(1) of the Federal Courts Act specifies that the Attorney General of Canada or "anyone directly affected" by the matter in respect of which relief is sought has standing to apply for

67. SOR98-106.
68. FEDERAL COURTS ACT, R.S.C., 1985 c. F-7, § 28(2).
69. Ass'n of Architects (Ont.) v. Ass'n of Architectural Techs. (Ont.), [2003] 1 F.C. 331,
2002 FCA 218; leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2003), 313 N.R. 195n (S.C.C.).
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judicial review. The term "anyone directly affected" has been
given broad interpretation by the courts and generally refers to
anyone whose interests or rights will be impacted by the administrative tribunal's decision or activity. It also includes public inter-

est standing. 70
Administrative tribunals themselves play no role in judicial review proceedings unless their constituting statute stipulates, or
the court grants the tribunal power to intervene. The role of a
tribunal whose decision is at issue before the court is limited to
explaining the record before the tribunal and to making representations with respect to jurisdiction.
b.

Time Limits to Bring an Application for Judicial
Review

Subsection 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act provides that an
application for judicial review must be commenced in the prescribed manner within thirty days after the time the decision or
order was first communicated by the administrative tribunal to
the Attorney General or to the party directly affected by it. A
judge may allow further time before or after the expiration of the
thirty days; however, the applicant must justify the delay and establish a reasonable chance of success on the merits. 71
5.

Scope of JudicialReview

In exercising their power of judicial review, courts must respect
the choices made by legislatures. This is why the scope of judicial
review is generally narrow; it does not have the same status as an
appeal. Courts will not retry a matter that was decided by the
tribunal.
Canadian courts are called upon to decide a range of issues that
may have a significant impact on the lives of those involved and,
more generally, on Canadian life. In the context of the Charter,
the judiciary has adopted the role of protector of the constitutional
rights and freedoms of Canadians. To fulfill this role, judges are
called upon to determine a vast array of complex and divisive issues. The resolution of these disputes often embraces social and
moral questions that are of profound importance to society.

70. Sunshine Village Corp. v. Superintendent of Banff Nat'l Park (1966), 44 Admin.
L.R. (2d) 201 (F.C.A.).
71. FEDERAL COURTSACT, R.S.C., 1985 c. F-7, § 18.1(2).
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In Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, 72 an employer could
prohibit an employee from taking bereavement leave following the
death of his same-sex partner's father. To resolve this question,
the Court was required to determine whether a same-sex couple
constituted a "family" under the CanadianHuman Rights Act.
In Sauv6 v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 73 the Federal
Court of Appeal was asked to determine the scope of a prisoner's
fundamental democratic right to vote in a federal election.
In Friends of the Island, Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Public
Works), 74 the Court was asked to review the environmental assessment of the Confederation Bridge Project joining PEI and New
Brunswick. The Court was also asked to determine whether the
project was constitutional.
In Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of
Tranport),75 an environmental group sought to compel the federal
government to conduct environmental assessment with respect to
a dam constructed on the Oldman River by the province of Alberta. The Federal Court of Appeal was required to determine the
constitutional and statutory validity of guidelines used by the federal government in carrying out its duties.
The enactment of Canada's Anti-terrorim Act 76 in late 2001 in
the aftermath of September 11 has also significantly impacted the
scope of judicial review in relation to matters of national security.
The Anti-terrorim Act amended sixteen statutes and implemented
two separate United Nations Conventions concerning the financing of terrorism and the suppression of terrorist bombings. The
Preamble to the Anti-terrorim Act speaks to "taking comprehensive measures to protect Canadians against terrorist activity while
continuing to respect and promote the values reflected in, and the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms." The substantive provisions of the Act deal
with a multitude of matters related to judicial investigative hearings, procedures, seizures, arrests, recognizance, detention, etc.
As noted by Professor Mullan:
While Parliament did not go as far as to include a provision in
that Act stating that it or various of its provisions applied

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

[1990] F.C.J. No. 563 (QL).
[2000] 2 F.C. 117 (F.C.A.).
(1993] 2 F.C. 229 (F.C.).
[1990] 2 F.C. 18, [1990] F.C.J. No. 86 (QL).
2001 S.C., c. 41.
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notwithstanding the protections afforded by the Charter, the
substantive provisions of the body of that legislation as well
as the amendments it makes to the provisions of other legislation have significant impact on the normal principles of administrative law. 77
In the case of In re Application Under § 83.28 of the Criminal
Code,78 the Supreme Court of Canada stated that, "[a]lthough terrorism necessarily changes the context in which the rule of law
must operate, it does not call for the abdication of law."7 9 In that
case, the Supreme Court of Canada considered for the first time
questions about the constitutional validity of provisions of the
Anti-terrorim Act, which were adopted as amendments to Canada's Criminal Code.8 0 The Supreme Court explained that:
[T]he challenge for a democratic state's answer to terrorism
calls for a balancing of what is required for an effective response to terrorism in a way that appropriately recognizes the
fundamental values of the rule of law. In a democracy, not
every response is available to meet the challenge of terrorism.
At first blush, this may appear to be a disadvantage, but in
reality, it is not. A response to terrorism within the rule of
law preserves and enhances the cherished liberties that are
essential to democracy.81
The role of the judiciary as "resolver of disputes, interpreter of
the law and defender of the Constitution"8 2 remains unchanged in
times of crisis. What is changing, however, are the tools and resources that judges can draw upon when they are interpreting and
applying the law. The events of September 11 and the response of
the world, including the enactment of anti-terrorim legislation by
various governments such as Canada's Anti-terrorim Act, have
created a new environment for judicial decision-making. Within
this new climate, judges must adopt a global perspective in performing their role. The Canadian judiciary must be aware of and
take into account the various declarations, resolutions and con77. David J. Mullan, The View from North America: A CanadianPerspective on Three
Troubling Issues, 17 C.J.A.L.P. 167, 194 (2004).
78. [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40 (QL), 2004 SCC 42.
79. Id. at para. 6.
80. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
81. In re Application Under § 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, [2004]
S.C.J. No. 40 (QL), 2004 SCC 42 at para. 7.
82. Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56.
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ventions made by non-adjudicative bodies with international
standing, as well as the decisions of international tribunals. A
complete understanding of the legislation under review and the
83
Charterrequires consideration of the international perspective.
Examples of cases involving judicial review in the context of national security include the following. In Suresh, the Court was
asked to determine whether a refugee who, in the opinion of the
Minister of Immigration, posed a danger to the security of Canada
could be removed from Canada to a country where he faced torture.
In Poshteh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),8 4 the Federal Court of Appeal had to determine whether
there were reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant, who
was a minor at the time, was a member of a terrorist organization
for purposes of determining whether he was inadmissible to Canada on security grounds under the Immigration Refugee and Pro85
tection Act.
In Harkat v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),8 6 the Federal Court of Appeal was required to evaluate the
extent and likelihood of the threat to national security if the detained person was released, as well as the likelihood and extent to
which the conditions of release would negate or contain that
threat or risk of threat.
6.

Standard of Review

In every case, the reviewing court must begin by determining
the appropriate standard of review.8 7 The term "standard of review" generally refers to the level of intensity with which the judiciary will review the decision of an administrative tribunal. It is
the amount of deference that will be accorded to the administrative action.
The Supreme Court of Canada recently confirmed in Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan that there are only three standards
of review for judicial review of administrative action: correctness,
reasonableness and patent unreasonableness.8 8 The test to de83.
84.
85.

Suresh v. Canada, [2000] 2 F.C. 592.
[2005] F.C.J. No. 381 (QL), 2005 FCA 85 (F.C.A.).
MMINGRATION REFUGEE AND PROTECTION ACT, S.C. 2001, c. 27.

86. [2006] F.C.J. No. 1091 (QL), 2006 FCA 259 (F.C.A.).
87. Dr. Q. v. Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons of B.C., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19
at para. 21.
88. Id. at para. 20, 24.
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termine the standard of review is referred to as the pragmatic and
functional analysis and was established in a long line of cases
89
from the Supreme Court of Canada.
The pragmatic and functional approach determines the standard of review in relation to four contextual factors:
1) the presence or absence of a privative clause or statutory
right of appeal;
2) the expertise of the tribunal relative to the reviewing court on
the issue in question;
3) the purposes of the legislation and the provision in particular;
and
4) the nature of the question - law, fact, or mixed law and
fact. 90
A highly technical or mechanistic approach is to be avoided. It
is the interplay among the four factors that will determine the
level of deference owed to the administrative decision itself. 91
The first factor requires an examination of the enabling statute
to determine the presence or absence of a privative clause or
statutory right of appeal. A statutory right of appeal indicates
that the legislature intended for the tribunal's decisions to be subject to court review and therefore suggests less deference. 92 A privative clause refers to a clause "that declares that the decisions of
the tribunal are final and conclusive from which no appeal lies
and all forms of judicial review are excluded." 93 A privative clause
indicates a legislative intention to restrict a court's review of a
tribunal's decision. The presence of a "full" privative clause is
compelling evidence that the court ought to show deference to the
tribunal's decision, unless other factors strongly indicate the con94
trary with regard to the particular determination in question.
The second factor - the relative expertise of the tribunal - is
viewed as the most important facet of the analysis. 95 The question
89. U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; Pezim v. British Columbia
(Superintendent Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; Dr. Q v. Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons of
B.C., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19; Law Soc'y of N.B. v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247,
2003 SCC 20; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63.
90. Law Soc'y of N.B. v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20 at para. 27.
91. Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Lethbridge Cmty. Coll., [2004] S.C.J. No.
24 (QL) at para. 14.
92. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1
S.C.R. 982 at para. 30.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Canada (Dir. of Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v. Southam, Inc.,
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 748.
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is whether the decision-making body has greater expertise than
96
the reviewing court with respect to the question under review.
There are three dimensions to this evaluation: the court must
characterize the expertise of the tribunal in question; it must consider its own expertise relative to that of the tribunal; and it must
identify the nature of the specific issue before the administrative
decision-maker relative to this expertise. 9 7 As a general rule, if a
tribunal has been constituted with a particular expertise with respect to achieving the aims of an act, a higher degree of deference
will be given. 98 On the other hand, a lack of expertise on the part
of the tribunal regarding the particular issue before it will be
grounds for less deference. 99
The third factor requires consideration of the purpose of the legislation and the provision in question. As a general rule, greater
deference will be afforded when legislation is intended to resolve
and balance competing policy objectives or the interests of various
constituencies. 10 0 Also, "[a] legislative purpose that deviates substantially from the normal role of the courts suggests that the legislature intended to leave the issue to the discretion of the administrative decision-maker and, therefore, militates in favour of
greater deference." 10 1 By contrast, where an administrative structure more closely resembles that of a court, less deference will be

owed. 102
The fourth and final factor - the nature of the problem - requires identification of the question under review. In general,
pure questions of fact of administrative bodies are afforded greater
deference than are questions of law. Where the question is one of
mixed fact and law, more deference is owed if the question is factually intensive. If the question is legally intensive, less deference
is owed. Where the question involves the exercise of discretion by
the tribunal, greater deference will be accorded.
As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court affirmed, this functional and pragmatic analysis must be undertaken every time a

96. Dr. Q. v. Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons of B.C., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19
at para. 2"8.
97. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1
S.C.R. 982 at para. 33.
98. Id. at para. 35.
99. Id. at para. 33.
100. Id. at para. 36.
101. Dr. Q v. Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons of B.C., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19
at para. 31.
102. Id. at para. 32.
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review involves an administrative body exercising delegated powers, including the exercise of discretion. The pragmatic and functional approach may result in the application of different standards of review to various administrative tribunals. In a more
recent decision, the Federal Court of Appeal held that "the pragmatic and functional approach must be undertaken anew by the
reviewing Court with respect to each decision of an administrative
tribunal, not only each general type of decision of a particular administrative body under a particular provision." 103 The same
standard of review will not necessarily apply to all aspects of a
tribunal's decision, especially if the tribunal is dealing with multiple complaints at once. In Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of
Public Employees (CUPE), Local 79,104 for example, there were
two standards of review in play: the standard of correctness applied to the question of whether the employees' criminal convictions could be re-litigated, while the standard of patent unreasonableness applied to the issue of whether the employees had been
dismissed for just cause.1 05 The standard of review applicable to
the decision of a tribunal may therefore vary depending on the
statutory provision that is the subject of judicial review.
Depending on how the factors of the pragmatic and functional
approach play out in a particular instance, the standard of review
applicable to a tribunal's decision may be the standard of correctness, reasonableness or patent unreasonableness, each requiring
more or less deference towards the decision of the tribunal.
There has been some frustration with the apparent lack of clarity with respect to the relationship between the standard of patent
unreasonableness and that of reasonableness simpliciter. The Supreme Court of Canada addressed this in CUPE Local 79 and reevaluated the contours of the various standards of review, especially with respect to patent unreasonableness. In broad terms, a
decision will be patently unreasonable where there is no doubt
that the decision is defective because it is "clearly irrational" or
"evidently not in accordance with reason."'106
Finally, there is an important distinction to be made between
judicial review on the ground of breach of procedural fairness and
the standard of review in other cases of substantive judicial review. The pragmatic and functional analysis only applies to the
103.
104.
105.
106.

Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] F.C.J. No. 2056 (F.C.A.) (QL).
CUPE, Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, [2003] S.C.J. No. 64 (QL), 2003 SCC 63.
Id. at para. 95.
Id. at para. 81.
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latter. The Supreme Court of Canada addressed this issue in Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Ontario (Minister of Labour)10 7 where Justice Binnie explained that "[t]he content of procedural fairness goes to the manner in which the Minister went
about making his decision, whereas the standard of review is applied to the end product of his deliberations."1 0 8 He continued:
On occasion, a measure of confusion may arise in attempting
to keep separate these different lines of enquiry. Inevitably
some of the same "factors" that are looked at in determining
the requirements of procedural fairness are also looked at in
considering the "standardof review" of the discretionary deci09
sion itself.l
An administrative decision may therefore be reviewed both in
terms of procedural fairness and according to the pragmatic and
functional standard of review. In such circumstances, a court is
required to isolate any act or omission relevant to procedural fairness from the substantive decision. The procedural fairness element is reviewed as a question of law, meaning that no deference
is due. The decision-maker will have either complied with or
breached the particular duty of fairness. If the duty of fairness is
breached, the decision in question will be set aside. With respect
to the substantive decision, the appropriate standard of review
will be determined according to the pragmatic and functional
analysis. 110
7.

JudicialRemedies
a.

InterlocutoryMeasures

The commencement of an application for judicial review does
not prevent an administrative body's decision from taking effect
nor does it stop the proceedings in progress. An applicant for judicial review may therefore seek to stay the proceeding before the
tribunal or prevent the federal tribunal from executing its order or
decision until the court rules on the judicial review application.
Section 18.2 provides that the Federal Court may make any in107. [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, 2003 SCC 29.
108. Id. at 591.
109. Id. at 592.
110. Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] F.C.J. No. 2056 (F.C.A.) (QL) at
para. 52-57.
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terim orders that it considers appropriate pending the final disposition of the judicial review application before it. The Federal
Court of Appeal also has this power.
The test used by the Court in deciding to grant a stay is the
same as that used in the granting of interlocutory injunctions. 1 '
The Supreme Court of Canada established a three-stage test for
interlocutory injunctions in RJR-Macdonald, Inc. v. Canada
(A.G.). 112 At the first stage, the applicant must demonstrate a serious question to be tried. At the second stage, the applicant must
establish that it will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not
granted. The third stage, requiring an assessment of the balance
of convenience by the Court, will often determine the result in applications involving Charterrights.
b.

FinalRemedies

Although a person may have a right to seek judicial review before the Federal Court, this does not mean that the Court is required to undertake judicial review. The relief which a court may
grant by way of judicial review is discretionary. 113 Subsection
18.1(3) describes the relief that the Federal Court may grant on an
application for judicial review. The Court may:
e order a federal board, commission or other tribunal to do any
act or thing it has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing; 114 or
* declare invalid or unlawful, or quash, set aside and refer back
for determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be appropriate, prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or
proceeding of a federal board, commission or other tribunal. " 5
The Federal Court of Appeal has the same remedial powers on
judicial review as the Federal Court. 116
The Federal Courts also have the power to issue prerogative and
extraordinary remedies under subsection 18(1), which include the
issuance of an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition,
writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or the grant of declaratory relief. A writ of habeas corpus may be issued pursuant to
111. See RJR-Macdonald, Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311; Toth v. Canada
(Min. of Employment & Immigration) (1998), 6 Imm. R. (2d) 123 (F.C.A.).
112. [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, 54 C.P.R. (3d) 114.
113. Canadian Pac. Ltd. V. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3, (QL) at para. 30.
114. FEDERAL CouRTs ACT, R.S.C., 1985 c. F-7 § 18.1(3)(a).
115. Id. § 18.1(3)(b).
116. Id. § 28(2).
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subsection 18(2) only in relation to any member of the Canadian
Forces serving outside Canada.
Canadian courts have no jurisdiction to award damages in judicial review proceedings.
8.

The "Dialogue"

Judicial review under the Charter has come under scrutiny.
Some argue that judicial review of the Charter is undemocratic
because judges are substituting their views of policy for that of
elected representatives of government. The answer to this sort of
criticism lies within the Charter itself, which provides for the supremacy of the rule of law. However, in a paper entitled The
Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps
The Charterof Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All), authors
Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell observe that this answer may be
unsatisfactory because:
[T]he law of the Constitution is for the most part couched in
broad, vague language that rarely speaks definitely to the
cases that come before the courts. Accordingly, judges have a
great deal of discretion in "interpreting" the law of the constitution into the likeness favoured by the judges. This problem
has been captured in a famous American aphorism: "We are
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges

say it is."117
Instead, the authors suggest that judicial review is part of a dialogue between the judiciary and the legislatures. 118 As they explain, "[w]hen the Court strikes down law, it frequently offers a
suggestion as to how the law could be modified to solve the constitutional problems. The legislative body often follows that suggestion, or devises a different law that also skirts the constitutional
barriers."' 119 According to their research, which surveyed sixtyfive cases in which a law was struck down for breach of the Charter, "in forty-four cases (two-thirds), the competent legislative body
amended the impugned law"'120 and "[i]n most cases, relatively
minor amendments were all that was required in order to respect
117.

See P. Hogg & A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures,

35 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 75, 77 (1997).

118. Id. at 79.
119. Id. at 80.
120. Id. at 80-81.
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the Charter, without compromising the objective of the original
12 1
legislation."
The Federal Court of Appeal recognized the existence of a continuing "dialogue" between courts and legislatures in Sauv6 v.
Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),122 a case that addressed the issue of prisoner voting rights. Justice Linden noted that:
In 1992 and 1993, two Appeal Courts and the Supreme Court
of Canada held that a blanket disqualification of prisoners
from voting, contained in earlier legislation which was challenged, violated section 3 of the Charter and could not be
saved by section 1 of the Charter. Parliament responded to
this judicial advice by enacting legislation aimed at accomplishing part of its objectives while complying with the Char23
ter. 1
Accordingly, without making policy decisions on behalf of government, courts may give guidance to Parliament and legislatures
on how a Charterviolation may be remedied. Courts have flexibility in determining what course of action to take following a violation of the Charter. Depending on the circumstances, "a court may
strike down legislation or a legislative provision but suspend the
effect of that declaration until Parliament or the provincial legislatures has had an opportunity to fill the void."'124 Additionally,
the court may resort to the technique of reading meaning into the
legislation where appropriate. 125 All these remedies allow the
courts to interfere with the laws adopted by the legislature as little as possible and give the government an opportunity to amend
the offending statute to ensure conformity with the principles of
the Charter.
Hogg and Bushell describe the dialogue between courts and legislatures in reference to the Supreme Court decision in RJRMacDonald,Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General).126 They note that:
In RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada (A.G.) (1995), the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a federal law that pro121. Id. at 81.
122. [1999] F.C.J. No. 1577 (F.C.A.).
123. Id. at para. 1 (citing Belczowski v. Canada (Attorney General) [1993] 2 S.C.R.
438; Sauvd v. Canada (Attorney General) (1992), 89 D.L.R. (4th) 644 (Ont. C.A.) at 65051; Belczowski v. Canada [1992] 2 F.C. 440 (C.A.)).
124. Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68 (QL) at para. 25.
125. Id.
126. [19951 3 S.C.R. 199.
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hibited the advertising of tobacco products. In its discussion
of the least restrictive means standard, the Court made clear
that it would have upheld restrictions that were limited to
"lifestyle advertising" or advertising directed at children.
Within two years of the decision, Parliament enacted a comprehensive new Tobacco Act. The new Act prohibits lifestyle
advertising and restricts advertising to media which is targeted at adults, but allows tobacco manufacturers to use informational and brand-preference advertising in order to
27
promote their products to adult smokers. 1
Another example of this type of dialogue arose out of the Su8
preme Court of Canada Reference Manitoba Language Rights,12
where Acts of the legislature of Manitoba were declared invalid
and of no force or effect because they were printed in English only,
as opposed to English and French, contrary to the requirements of
the Manitoba Act, 1870. However, to preserve the rule of law, the
Supreme Court held that those offending statutes would be
deemed temporarily to have been, and continue to be, effective:
All Acts of the Manitoba Legislature which would currently be
valid and of force and effect, were it not for their constitutional defect, are deemed temporarily valid and effective from
the date of this judgment to the expiry of the minimum period
necessary for translation, re-enactment, printing and publishing. Rights, obligations and any other effects which have
arisen under these current laws by virtue of reliance on acts
of public officials, or on the assumed legal validity of public or
private bodies corporate, are enforceable and forever beyond
challenge under the de facto doctrine. The same is true of
those rights, obligations and other effects which have arisen
under current laws and are saved by doctrines such as res ju29
dicata and mistake of law. 1
With respect to the duration of the temporary period, the Court
was not equipped to determine the period during which it would
not be possible for the Manitoba legislature to comply with its constitutional duty. The Court therefore decided to set a special hearing on application by the government to hear submissions and de-

127. Hogg & Bushell, supra note 117, at 86-87.
128. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36 (QL).
129. Id. at para. 109.
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termine the minimum period necessary for translation, reenactment, printing and publishing of the statutes.
PART III: APPELLATE REVIEW OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
In closing, I wish to contrast the standard of review in administrative matters with that in judicial matters.
A.

Appellate Review

A party who is not satisfied with the decision of a court on a judicial review application may appeal that decision. Judgments of
the Federal Court are appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal
pursuant to section 27 of the Federal Courts Act. Subject to certain exceptions, notably in immigration matters, 130 the appeal to
the Federal Court of Appeal is available as of right, and leave to
appeal is not required. 131 In addition to appeals from the Federal
Court, subsection 27(1.1) of the Federal Courts Act confers to the
Federal Court of Appeal jurisdiction to determine appeals from
judgments of the Tax Court of Canada.
When the judicial review application is decided by the Federal
Court of Appeal, that decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court of Canada, but only with leave to appeal. 132 There is, however, an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from a decision of
the Federal Court of Appeal under section 19 of the Federal Courts
Act, which deals with intergovernmental disputes.
The powers of the Federal Court of Appeal in the appellate context are set out in section 52 of the Federal Courts Act. When the
appeal is from the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal may dismiss
the appeal, give the judgment and award the process or other proceedings that the Federal Court should have given or awarded.
Additionally, the Court may order a new trial if it is in the ends of
justice to do so, or the Court may make a declaration as to the
conclusions that the Federal Court should have reached on the
issues decided by it and refer the matter back to the Federal Court
on that basis. In the case of all other appeals, the Federal Court
130. See subsection 82.1 of the IMMIGRATION ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, which provides
that "an application for judicial review under the Federal Courts Act with respect to any
decision or order made, or any matter arising, under this Act or the rules or regulations
thereunder may be commenced only with leave of a judge of the Federal Court - Trial
Division ."
131. FEDERAL COURTS ACT, R.S.C., 1985 c. F-7, § 27(1).
132. SUPREME COURT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, § 37.1, 40.
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of Appeal may dismiss the appeal, give the decision that should
have been given, or refer the matter back for determination in accordance with such directions it considers appropriate.
B.

Types of Questions

There is an important distinction to be made between the review of an administrative decision and the review of an appeal
from a lower court decision. The pragmatic and functional approach only applies to the review of decisions by administrative
tribunals. For review of judicial decisions, the rules of appellate
review of lower courts apply. This test was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Housen v. Nikolaisen.133 That test is
concerned with the nature of the question in issue. The Supreme
Court of Canada identified four types of questions: (1) questions of
law; (2) questions of fact; (3) inferences of fact; and (4) questions of
mixed fact and law.
C.

Standardof Review

The standard of review on a question of law is that of correctness. 134 The appellate court is therefore free to replace the opinion of the trial judge. The standard of review for findings of fact
and inferences of fact is "palpable and overriding error."'135 This
means that findings of fact will not be reversed unless it can be
established that the trial judge forgot, ignored or misconceived the
evidence in a way that affected his conclusion.136 The standard of
review for inferences of fact is also palpable and overriding error.
"If there is no palpable and overriding error with respect to the
underlying facts that the trial judge relied on to draw the inference, then it is only where the inference-drawing process itself is
palpably in error that an appellate court can interfere with the
factual conclusion."' 13 7 Lastly, the standard of review for questions
of mixed fact and law is palpable and overriding error, "unless it is
clear that the trial judge made some extricable error in principle

133. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31 (QL), 2002 SCC 33.
134. Id. at para. 8.
135. Id. at para. 10.
136. Elders Grain Co. Ltd. v. Vessel M/V "Ralph Misener," [2002] FCA 139 at para. 10.
137. Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31 (QL), 2002 SCC 33
at para. 23.
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with respect to the characterization of the legal test or its applica138
tion, in which case the error may amount to an error of law."
On appeal from an exercise of discretion by a trial judge, regard
should be given to the following passage of the Federal Court of
Appeal decision in Elders Grain Co. Ltd. v. The Vessel M/V
139
"RalphMisener"
An appellate court is not at liberty merely to substitute its
own exercise of discretion for the discretion already exercised
by the trial judge. However, if the decision was based on an
error of law or if the appellate court reaches the clear conclusion that there has been a wrongful exercise of discretion in
that no weight, or no sufficient weight, has been given to relevant considerations or that the trial judge considered irrelevant factors or failed to consider relevant factors, then an appellate court is entitled to exercise its own discretion. 140
The question of the appropriate standard of review is a question
of law and, therefore, must be answered correctly by a reviewing
judge in the lower court. If the reviewing judge has erred in
choosing or applying the standard of review, the Federal Court of
Appeal must correct the error, substitute the appropriate standard, and assess or remit the administrative decision-maker's determination on that analysis.
The role of an appellate court when reviewing the decision of an
administrative tribunal on the Charteris subject to judicial review
on a correctness standard. 14 1 An error of law by an administrative
tribunal interpreting the Constitution can always be reviewed
fully by a superior court. 142
CONCLUSION

If there is anything that you should remember from my article,
it is this: administrative law in Canada is intrinsically linked to
the Canadian Constitution and, more particularly, to the constitutional division of powers. The Federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures can only delegate to administrative bodies those
powers that fall within their respective spheres of competence.
138. Elders Grain Co. Ltd. v. Vessel MV "Ralph Misener," [2002] FCA 139 at para. 12.
139. [2002] FCA 139.
140. Id. at para. 13.
141. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Bd.) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504.
142. Id. at para. 31.
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Administrative tribunals are creatures of statute. They can
only exercise those duties and functions that are expressly or implicitly delegated to them in their enabling statute. In carrying
out their mandate, administrative tribunals must, at a minimum,
comply with the common law rules of procedural fairness and respect the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Charter.
When judicially reviewing the decisions of administrative bodies, judicial courts have the difficult task of striking a balance between the intent of the legislature in delegating powers to administrative bodies with ensuring respect of the rule of law. The principle of judicial independence is vital to meaningful judicial review
and to the achievement of that balance. Courts must be able to
hear and decide cases before them free of outside influence, including political pressures from government. Otherwise, judicial review is only an illusion.
Also, it is important to remember that judicial review is not an
appeal. A court will not automatically substitute its decision for
that of an administrative body. The factors of the pragmatic and
functional approach will assist in setting a standard of review.
That standard will dictate how much deference must be afforded
to the decision of the administrative tribunal. In some cases, this
may mean that a decision will be allowed to stand even where the
reviewing court would have arrived at a different conclusion.
Where, however, judicial review is justified, courts have broad
powers to provide a remedy that is appropriate under the circumstances.
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143. Canada has a complex, multi-tiered court system. Canadian Judicial Council, Annual Report, 2004-2005, http://www.cjcx-ccm.gc.ca/article.asp?id=2274.

